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FOREWORD
The reemergence of China on the global stage is
arguably one of the most important phenomena of
our time. With its sustained high rates of economic
growth, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has dramatically increased trade and investment flows with
the rest of the world, including regions such as Latin
America, with which it historically has had very little
interaction. In many of these countries, the PRC has
gone from having an almost negligible economic presence to replacing the United States as the number one
or number two trading partner. Moreover, particularly since the end of the global financial crisis, Chinese
companies, in coordination with the Chinese government and banks, have begun to make multibillion dollar loans and investments in Latin America, creating
a rapidly expanding presence of Chinese companies
and workers in the region in such sectors as construction, logistics, manufacturing, telecommunications,
and retail. In terms of “soft power,” the PRC has arguably captured the imaginations of Latin American political leaders, businessmen, and students as a power
meriting attention and, in some cases, courtship.
While a great deal of attention has been given to
Chinese commercial activity in Latin America, very
little has been written in the open press regarding Chinese military engagement with the region. While visits by senior military leaders and major arms sales are
reported in the Latin American press, there has been,
to date, almost no detailed, comparative analysis of
the PRC-Latin America military relationship. This is
particularly striking, given the emphasis placed on
military relationships in determining whether Chi-
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nese engagement with the region constitutes a threat
to U.S. national security interests.
Dr. Evan Ellis of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies fills an important void in the burgeoning literature regarding China’s activities with Latin
America. This monograph provides a detailed, region-wide analysis of PRC military engagement with
Latin America, including not only arms sales, but also
senior-level military visits, personnel exchanges, and
activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in
the region, ranging from its 6-year participation in the
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces in Haiti, to
its November 2010 humanitarian exercise in Peru, Angel de la Paz. The work leverages the extensive Spanish
and English-language primary research by Dr. Ellis in
the open source literature of the region, as well as offthe-record interviews with current and former Latin
American military officers who have directly participated in the activities treated.
Dr. Ellis explains that Chinese military activity in
Latin America is far more extensive than is commonly
recognized. At the same time, it also goes against conventional wisdom by arguing that, in the short term,
such activity does not seek to achieve formal alliances
or a permanent military presence in the region, but
rather to advance commercial and political objectives
to include increasing China’s understanding of, and
influence within, Latin American governments.
While the arguments of Dr. Ellis may be surprising
to some, the monograph will undoubtedly serve as an
important reference point for scholars from multiple
perspectives: those following the rise of China, those
studying Latin American security issues, students of
international relations, and students of U.S. national
security, among others.

iv

In the course of these expanding interactions, the
PRC has emphasized the “peaceful nature” of its interactions, which have profound implications not only
for the world’s economy, but for its security environment as well. The growth of China has played out differently in each region.
		

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Over the past several years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has expanded its military ties with
Latin America in multiple important ways. High-level
trips by Latin American defense and security personnel to the PRC and visits by their Chinese counterparts have become commonplace. The volume and
sophistication of Chinese arms sold to the region has
increased. Officer exchange programs, institutional
visits, and other lower-level ties have also expanded.
Chinese military personnel have begun participating
in operations in the region in a modest, yet symbolically important manner.
Military engagement among Western countries
traditionally has focused on securing greater capability for confronting an adversary, including alliances
and base access agreements, that confer strategic
geographical position. By contrast, Chinese military
engagement primarily supports broader objectives
of national development and regime survival. This
includes building good will, understanding, and political leverage among important commercial partners
and technology sources, creating the tools to protect
PRC interests in countries where it does business, selling Chinese products and moving up the value-added
chain in strategically important sectors, and positioning the PRC strategically, even while avoiding alarming the United States over its activities in the region.
Chinese military engagement with the region may
be understood in terms of five interrelated types of
activities: (1) meetings between senior military officials, (2) lower-level military-to-military interactions,
(3) military sales, (4) military-relevant commercial in-
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teractions, and (5) Chinese physical presence within
Latin America with military-strategic implications.
Based on official visits documented in the press,
the number of visits by senior Chinese defense officials to Latin America, and visits by their counterparts
to China, has increased over the past several years. In
the second half of 2010, the number of contacts was
particularly high, including nine visits at the Minister
of Defense or Chief of Staff level between senior Chinese military officials and their Latin American counterparts, in Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, Mexico, Brazil,
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.
The PRC has expanded the quantity and scope
of its military-to-military contacts at the institutional
level, including its ongoing participation in the peacekeeping mission in Haiti and an increasing number of
personnel exchanges for training and education, joint
exercises, institutional visits, and symbolic activities.
Chinese institutions host Latin American military
personnel from at least 18 states in Latin America in
a range of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
institutions including the PLA Defense Studies Institute in Changping; the Army Command College
and the Chinese Navy Command School, both in the
vicinity of Nanjing; and a facility in Shijiazhuang. In
November 2010, the PLA also conducted its first bilateral military exercise in the region, the humanitarian
assistance exercise Angel de la Paz.
In the domain of military sales, Chinese activities
in Latin America are also much more extensive than is
generally recognized. Although such sales were once
impeded by concerns over quality, maintenance, and
logistics support, Chinese arms conglomerates such
as NORINCO are moving up the value-added chain,
leveraging the opening provided by Venezuelan pur-
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chases of K-8 aircraft and JYL-1 radars, selling similar
equipment to Venezuelan allies Ecuador and Bolivia,
and proving their goods in the region in general.
Other landmark purchases include the lease of MA60 transport aircraft to Bolivia, with a sale of 4 of the
same aircraft under negotiation with Ecuador, as well
as the sale of WMZ-551 armored personnel carriers
to Argentina, and the subsequently cancelled sale of
MBT-2000 main battle tanks to Peru. Training of military personnel, as well as command and control packages such as that by Huawei for the Venezuelan organization DICOFAN, have also been important, as has
the donation of nonlethal goods. Bolivia stands out for
the quantities of trucks, busses, and other goods donated to the Bolivian military by the PLA since 2006,
as does Jamaica, whose very small defense force received a $3.5 million donation of nonlethal goods in
the months following the exposure of serious capability gaps associated with its forced entry into the Tivoli
Gardens neighborhood.
In addition to arms sales and contacts between the
PLA and Latin American militaries, select commercial
interactions must be considered as part of its military
engagement. In Latin America, this includes collaboration between the Brazilian aircraft manufacturer
Embraer and China Aviation Industrial Corporation
(CAIC) II to produce ERJ-145s business jets in Harbin,
China, as well as sales of Y-12 turboprop aircraft to
Venezuela. In the space industry, ties include four major ongoing space-related projects in Latin America,
the China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite (CBERS),
Venesat-1, the Venezuela Remote Sensing Satellite,
and the Tupac Katari satellite, as well as other projects
in development and more modest collaboration initiatives. In the telecommunications industry, Chinese
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firms such as Huawei and ZTE are major players in
the leading nations of Central and South America.
Finally, China has a low-profile but important
physical military presence in Latin America , including military police in Haiti since September 2004, as
well as a reported presence in at least three Soviet-era
monitoring facilities: Lourdes, Bejucal,1 and Santiago
de Cuba.2 In addition, the presence of Chinese logistics
companies in major ports of the region could facilitate
operations by the PRC in the region should relations
between the United States and the PRC significantly
worsen in the coming decades.
In analyzing the implications of the Chinese military presence in the region, this author recognizes that
such presence can contribute to legitimate regional
security needs, but also foment misunderstanding. It
argues that the United States should work with China
to achieve greater transparency regarding those activities, and to engage the PRC in a positive fashion
regarding their activities in the hemisphere, including
regular dialogue and the establishment of mechanisms
for resolving misunderstanding. In addition, however,
it must improve its understanding of the specific dangers and threats that could flow out of this presence,
using methodologies such as scenario-based gaming,
to see how different actors in the region could seek to
leverage or be influenced in their actions by the presence of China, including indirect pressures, and how
the commercial and other interests in Latin America of
actors such as Russia, Iran, and India might play into
the unfolding dynamic.
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CHINA–LATIN AMERICA MILITARY
ENGAGEMENT:
GOOD WILL, GOOD BUSINESS, AND
STRATEGIC POSITION
INTRODUCTION
One of the most common statements made in discussions of Chinese engagement with Latin America
is that such ties are primarily “commercial” in nature.
While true, the focus on the commercial dimension of
the relationship conceals the fact that, over the past
several years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
has also expanded its military ties with Latin America
in multiple important ways, consistent with its own
public declarations of intention. In November 2008,
for example, the PRC issued its first official policy
paper on Latin America in which it announced that
it sought to enhance “mutual visits by defense and
military officials of the two sides as well as personnel
exchanges,” and to deepen “professional exchanges in
military training, personnel training and peacekeeping.”1
China’s military engagement with Latin America
in recent years has both expanded and deepened
in a quite public manner. High-level trips by Latin
American defense and security personnel to the PRC
and visits by their Chinese counterparts have become
commonplace. The volume and sophistication of Chinese arms sold to the region have increased. Officer
exchange programs, institutional visits, and other
lower-level ties have also expanded. Chinese military personnel have begun participating in operations
in the region in modest, yet symbolically important
ways.
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Since the granting of port concessions in Panama
to the Hong-Kong-based firm Hutchison Whampoa
in 1999, Chinese military engagement with Latin
America has been one of the most broadly discussed,
but misunderstood, dimensions of PRC activities in
the region.2 The PRC’s military initiatives in Latin
America are arguably not the largest or most strategically significant part of its rapidly expanding interactions with the region. Nor do they visibly threaten the
United States or undermine pro-Western regimes in
the same fashion as Soviet military engagement with
Latin America during the Cold War. The initiatives,
however, are significant and growing, and continue
to be a key to the evaluation by U.S. decisionmakers
as to whether the Chinese presence in Latin America
constitutes a strategic threat to U.S. interests.
The purpose of this monograph is to analyze PRC
defense and security ties in Latin America. While it
also touches upon commercial and scientific activities
that may have military relevance, its focus is on activities in the military and police sphere, which have not,
to date, been analyzed in detail in a single document.
The monograph is divided into three sections:
1. Objectives of PRC defense and security engagement with Latin America,
2. Manifestations of that engagement, and
3. Conclusions.
OBJECTIVES OF PRC DEFENSE AND SECURITY
ENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN AMERICA
Given the predominantly commercial nature of
Chinese interactions with Latin America, it is important to begin the analysis of PRC military activities in
the region with a discussion of Chinese motivations
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for engagement with Latin America in general, and
how military ties and transactions simultaneously
support and put at risk those goals.
While the PRC has publicly professed its interest
in expanding military linkages with Latin America, it
has given very little explanation of its reasons for doing so, or how its military activities fit into its broader
engagement with the region. This does not imply
that such motivations are inherently nefarious—only
that they must be examined, based on the available
evidence as well as current and historical patterns of
Chinese decisionmaking.
In the spirit of Chinese thinkers such as Sun Zi,
PRC military initiatives in Latin America should be
understood as subordinate to, and in support of, longterm PRC national objectives in the region. In general, these objectives involve promoting and protecting China’s reemergence as a major global actor. The
imperatives and risks involved are a product of the
export-led growth strategy that the PRC has pursued
and refined since 1978. Specifically, it has leveraged
the opportunities presented by global information
and trade flows, and its initial comparative advantage
in abundant inexpensive labor to serve as a global
manufacturing hub, attracting and using foreign investment in a deliberate fashion to build its physical
and technological infrastructure and diversify its economic base, and thus moving progressively into ever
higher value-added economic activities.3
China’s pursuit of this strategy, and the nation’s
place in the global economy, has created a number of
imperatives:
1. securing access to reliable sources of primary
products in support of manufacturing activities and
capital formation,
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2. assuring the ability to feed the Chinese population as it both urbanizes and consumes more protein,
3. establishing and protecting markets for Chinese
goods as its producers continue to expand production
and move up the value-added chain,
4. securing access to technology and global information flows,
5. maintaining a presence in institutions key to
China’s global economic transactions, and
6. avoiding the consolidation of an international
coalition opposing the “rise” of the PRC.
Chinese military engagement with Latin America
supports each of these imperatives, albeit often in indirect ways. Chinese President Hu Jintao addressed
the role of the Chinese military in support of national
development objectives in his call for the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to carry out its “new
mission in the new century.”4 Similarly, China’s 2006
National Defense White Paper refers to the role of the
PLA in “fostering a security environment conducive
to China’s peaceful development.”5 Similar language
is contained in the November 2007 constitution of the
Chinese Communist Party, and the 2008 National Defense White Paper.6 Chinese authors have written about
the new “interest frontier” of the PRC, suggesting that
the PLA has an obligation to defend not only Chinese
interests within the physical territory of the PRC, but
to protect those interests which are found outside it as
well.7
Because U.S. political leaders generally view military activities in a manner very distinct from trade
and investment, Chinese leaders have incentives to be
quite cautious in their military engagement to avoid
undermining important national strategic goals in
Latin America. As a result, the imperatives for the
4

PRC of military engagement in Latin America contrast
sharply with conventional wisdom regarding the use
of the military instrument. These imperatives may be
inferred as follows:
1. Building good will, understanding, and political
leverage,
2. Creating the tools to protect PRC interests incountry,
3. Selling Chinese products and moving up the
value-added chain,
4. Positioning the PRC strategically in the region,
and
5. Reassuring the United States.
Building Good Will, Understanding, and Political
Leverage.
For the PRC, military engagement is one tool
among many for building political good will and leverage in a country to make more likely that it will not
oppose the entry of Chinese products or act against
its investments. Military activities are useful in this
context because the armed forces remain an important
political actor in most Latin American countries, although thinking of the military as a political instrument is also consistent with both Chinese communist
and pre-communist philosophy.
Knowing and being on good terms with the military leadership of a Latin American country help the
Chinese to understand the overall political dynamic
of that country, anticipate actions that could be taken
against PRC commercial interests, influence the political leadership through military friends where necessary, and anticipate or avoid actions that could be
taken by the armed forces in the political arena that
could impact Chinese interests.
5

Within the larger framework of military engagement, people-oriented activities such as leadership
visits, training, and exchange programs are particularly useful because they allow the PRC to confer personal benefits and establish relationships with current
and future defense leaders, while avoiding the type
of symbolism that military bases or military end-item
sales generate for Western analysts.
Creating the Tools to Protect Chinese Interests
In-Country.
As Chinese companies and businessmen expand
their physical presence in Latin America, they will experience a corresponding increase in the security challenges to people and operations that have confronted
the companies of other countries operating in the region, including kidnapping, extortion, and violence
associated with strikes, political protest, and terrorism. Chinese petroleum and mining firms operating
in remote areas are particularly vulnerable, as seen
by violence against Andes Petroleum and Petroriental north of Ecuador in 20068 and 2007.9 Problems
may also be expected with the transportation of goods
on newly opened highways and rail routes over the
Andes and through the Amazon jungle, such as the
northern and southern “bioceanic corridors” crossing
Peru, the “interoceanic corridor” from the north of
Chile through Bolivia and Brazil, and the future Manta-Manaus corridor.10 Cultural differences between
the Chinese and local populations are also likely to
contribute to tensions and increase the possibilities for
violence, as seen in the 2007 truckers’ strike against
Chinese shopkeepers in Buenos Aires, Argentina,11 or
the November 2004 violence against Chinese communities in Maracay and Valencia, Venezuela.12
6

In the near term, PRC companies will have to rely
upon Latin American police and armed forces, as well
as private security and the payment of protection
money, in order to avoid harm to Chinese personnel
and operations. As the value of Chinese investments
in the region and the resources flowing from it grow,
the PRC will have an increasing incentive to improve
the functionality of these security forces, and to ensure that the protection of Chinese personnel and operations receives priority. Similarly, it will have incentives to become involved in issues of port and airport
security in the region, as well as high-value geography which impacts the movement of goods, such as
the Panama Canal, as well as highway, rail, and alternative canal routes crossing the continent.13
Indeed, the PRC has already demonstrated a willingness to use its military to protect its commercial
interests in Africa, citing threats to these interests as
justification for deploying naval forces to conduct anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in December
2008.14 Also, there is already an ongoing debate within
the PRC regarding the best ways to protect Chinese
commercial operations, including discussions by retiring PLA military officers to form private security
companies to support commercial ventures abroad.15
Selling Chinese Products and Moving Up the
Value-Added Chain.
Although Chinese military exports are relatively
small by comparison to other goods, they contribute
to PRC national development in multiple ways. As
with other commercial products, military products
generate export revenues for Chinese companies such
as the defense conglomerate NORINCO, and sustain
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employment. Sales of nonlethal military goods such
as clothing and personal equipment in Latin America
by Chinese companies, for example, are often overlooked, but are a nontrivial business. Such sales also
sustain the health of the PRC defense industrial base,
and help it to advance its technical capabilities in support of national defense goals. This is particularly the
case with respect to high-end goods such as radars,
aircraft, armored vehicles, and other sophisticated
military end items or “dual-use” commercial goods,
where sales in Latin America help China to test, prove,
and refine its capabilities under field conditions in
strategically important sectors.
Positioning China Strategically in the Region.
Chinese military thinkers, as others around the
world, recognize the implications of the emergence of
the PRC as a principal global actor, including the need
to prepare for large-scale hostilities to protect these
global interests. Although the PLA is very careful to
cast its military preparations as “defensive” in nature, debates within the PLA over the need to develop
a “deterrent force,” and references to an “active defense”16 implicitly acknowledge that Chinese thinkers
have contemplated the necessity of carrying a future
conflict to the adversary. Moreover, although the PRC
currently lacks the capability to project significant military capability beyond Asia, the pursuit of “defense
in depth” by the PLA Navy foresees conducting the
battle as far away from its shores as capabilities will
allow, while references in the 2008 Defense White Paper
to close coordination between military struggle and
political, economic, and diplomatic endeavors17 suggest a global approach to thinking about warfare.
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Nothing in the public discourse of the Chinese
leadership, policy papers, or debates suggests that
Latin America is considered in the short term as a
base for military operations. Nonetheless, in the long
term, when the PRC is both economically and militarily more powerful than it is today, the ability to deter a
strategic adversary such as the United States through
holding it at risk in its own theater, and to disrupt its
ability to project power at home before those forces
can reach the PRC, is consistent with the aforementioned concepts, including a holistic, asymmetric approach towards warfare.18
Within this broad approach, China’s military ties
in Latin America afford geographically-specific benefits, such as collecting intelligence on the operation of
U.S. forces, creating diversionary crises, closing down
strategic chokepoints such as the Panama Canal, or
conducting disruption operations in close proximity
to the United States.
Reassuring the United States.
As noted previously, the PRC’s pursuit of military
objectives in the region is subordinate to its broader
national objectives. Where the two conflict, the exact balance will reflect the perceptions and self-confidence of the Chinese leadership and its propensity
for risk-taking, factors which continue to evolve with
each successive generation of Chinese leadership.
Direct forms of security assistance, for example, may
support the objective of protecting Chinese companies and resource flows, yet undermine the more
important strategic objective of preserving access by
the PRC to Western technology and markets. At the
very least, China has strong incentives to portray all
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military interactions with Latin American states in
a way that avoids an appearance of threatening the
United States, so as to minimize the risk of damage
to its broader objectives. In many cases, this goal not
only will impact how China represents its activities,
but how it structures them. Gifts of military medical
capabilities or logistics gear, for example, may be preferable to selling or donating more lethal end items because the former generates similar institutional good
will and contacts, while appearing less threatening.
In general, as this section has suggested, the course
taken by Chinese military engagement with Latin
America in the medium or long term is likely to differ significantly from that witnessed with respect to
Soviet military activities in the region during the Cold
War. In general, the PRC is more likely to refrain from
overtly provocative activities, such as the establishment of bases with a significant Chinese presence,
overt military assistance to groups trying to overthrow
a regime, unilateral military intervention in the region
in a contested leadership situation, or participation in
anti-US military alliances.
MANIFESTATIONS OF CHINESE MILITARY
ENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN AMERICA
Chinese military engagement with the region may
be understood in terms of five interrelated types of
activities: (1) meetings between senior military officials, (2) lower-level military-to-military interactions,
(3) military sales, (4) military-relevant commercial interactions, and (5) Chinese physical presence within
Latin America with military-strategic implications.
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Meetings Between Senior Military Officials.
Based on official visits documented in the press,
the number of visits by senior Chinese defense officials to Latin America, and visits by their counterparts
to China, has increased over the past several years.
The press accounts of the agendas of these visits suggest that the purpose is often to establish or strengthen
relationships, including not only exchanging views on
security matters, but also to discussing or finalizing
agreements for arms purchases, military exchanges,
or other contacts and transactions.
In the second half of 2010, the number of high-level
military-to-military contacts was particularly high, including eight clusters of visits at the Minister of Defense or Chief of Staff level between senior Chinese
military officials and their Latin American counterparts, including Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, Mexico,
Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.
1. In August 2010, Bolivian minister of Defense
Ruben Saavedra traveled to the PRC to meet with his
counterpart, then Chinese Minister of Defense Cao
Gangchuan.19
2. In September, Cuban General Leopoldo Cintra
Frias traveled to Beijing to meet with Minister Cao
and other senior PRC defense leaders.20
3. Later the same month, Chief of the PLA General
Staff Chen Bingde traveled to Lima, Peru, for a visit
that included a joint military-humanitarian exercise
between Chinese and Peruvian armed forces and the
donation of a $1.3 million mobile field hospital to the
Peruvian Army.21
4. Also in September, the new Chinese Minister of
Defense, Liang Guanglie, traveled to Bogota, Colombia, on the first of a three-nation visit to Latin America,
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meeting with Colombian Defense Minister Rodrigo
Rivera and other senior Colombian officials, and signing a defense cooperation agreement. 22
5. Following his visit to Colombia, Minister Liang
traveled to Brasilia, where he met with Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim,23 reciprocating a visit
paid by Jobim to China at the beginning of the same
month.24
6. The third leg of the September 2010 trip by Minister Liang took him to Mexico, where he met with the
senior leadership of both of the institutions of the Mexican armed forces: The Ministry of National Defense
(SEDENA) and the Ministry of the Navy (SEMAR).25
7. In November 2010, Chief of Staff Chen traveled
to Quito, Ecuador, on the first stop of a two-nation
visit, meeting with the Ecuadoran Minister of Defense
Javier Ponce, as well as the head of Ecuador’s Joint
Chief of Staff, Luis Ernesto Gonzalez.26
8. In the second stop of his trip, General Chen
traveled to Caracas, Venezuela, where he met with
his counterpart, Defense Minister Carlos Figueroa, to
prepare the military portion of the agenda for the 9th
annual ministerial-level meeting of the “China-Venezuela High-Level Mixed Commission,” held in Beijing
during the subsequent month.27
Although little of the substance of the discussions
during these visits makes it into the open press, their
role in advancing military relationships between China and the Latin American counterpart nation has arguably been greater than is generally recognized: such
visits allow the leaders involved to build familiarity
and confidence by speaking face-to-face, and to explore possibilities for future projects, from arms sales
to expanded military exchanges. Such visits also gen-
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erally include tours of host nation facilities and opportunities for informal discussion, raising possibilities for collaboration on issues which have captured
the attention of the leaders involved, within the limits
of their national policies. In some cases, initiatives
prepared prior to the trip by staff officers or other officials are ratified during the high-level visit, while
ideas generated during discussions become initiatives
to be subsequently explored, administratively driven
by the declared interest of the senior leadership.
Lower-Level Military-to-Military Interactions.
In the past several years, the PRC has expanded the
quantity and scope of its military-to-military contacts
at the institutional level, including its ongoing participation in the peacekeeping mission in Haiti and an increasing number of personnel exchanges for training
and education, joint exercises, institutional visits, and
symbolic activities. In each of these, the primary value
for the PRC is arguably building relationships at the
institutional level, as well as at the personal level with
future key figures in Latin American militaries. In the
process, it has also been able to increase its understanding of Latin American militaries and the security
environment of the region.
In Haiti, military police from the PLA continue to
serve as part of the United Nations peacekeeping force
(MINUSTAH) present in the country. Chinese peacekeepers have had a continual presence in Haiti since
the first contingent was deployed in September 2004.
Haiti also has the dubious distinction of having been
the site of the first officially-recognized Chinese military casualties on Latin American soil. Eight members
of the PLA were among the personnel killed in Haiti
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in January 2010, in conjunction with the earthquake
that devastated the country.28 Four of the Chinese
killed were members of the MINUSTAH police force,
while the other four were part of a six-person working
group from the Ministry of Public Security which was
visiting the United Nations (UN) headquarters facility
when its roof collapsed due to the earthquake.29 The
bodies of the victims were subsequently returned to
the PRC, where they posthumously received various
honors.30
The participation of the Chinese military in MINUSTAH for more than 6 years has arguably yielded
great benefits for the PRC. It has given the PLA and
hundreds of its soldiers first-hand experience in operating in the Latin American environment in a police
and security role—something which will be of particular value in the future if China begins to provide
security assistance to allies in the region in support of
the protection of its nationals and ongoing operations.
In addition, its presence in MINUSTAH has allowed
the PLA to better understand and build relationships
with the militaries of Brazil and other nations working alongside it in the operation, even while fostering good will in the region toward the PRC as a contributor to the international order. Finally, the Chinese
presence in Haiti has also arguably advanced its campaign to isolate Taiwan internationally, since it puts
pressure on the government of Haiti, which currently
affords diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, rather than
the PRC.31
In the realm of training and military education,
Chinese institutions host Latin American military personnel from at least 18 states in Latin America—virtually every country in the region with which the PRC
has diplomatic relations. The examples listed in the
following paragraphs are merely illustrative:
14

The National Defense University of the PLA has
multiple institutions offering courses in both English
and Spanish to Latin American officers. These include:
1. The Defense Studies Institute in Changping
(near Beijing), a school especially for foreigners within
the broader university, offering courses in both Spanish and English, including the following:
• A 5-month senior staff course, taught primarily in Spanish. The course is presented by a
combination of Chinese instructors and Communist-party vetted translators. Latin American nations sending officers have included
Mexico, Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay.
The Chilean army has been sending officers
to the course since 1999, while the Uruguayans have been sending students since at least
March 2009.
• A 3-month course on strategy, campaign
planning, and military thinking, attended by
officers of the Chilean Navy, among others,
since 1997.
• A 10-month course on “national defense and
command,” taught in English and attended
by officers from the Peruvian Army, the Chilean Navy and Air Force, and the Uruguayan
Navy and Air Force, among others.32
• A 5-month course on Military Strategy,
taught in Spanish, and attended by Peruvian
Army officers and Chilean Air Force personnel, among others.
2. The Army Command College, located in Nanjing, offers a 4-month course in English and French,
which has been attended by military officers from
Latin American countries including Colombia, Peru,
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Barbados, and Jamaica, as well as Africa and other regions.
3. The Chinese Navy Command School, outside
of Nanjing, offers a 1-year senior command course in
English. The course has been attended by Latin American military officers, among others, including officers
from Uruguay33 and Brazil.34
4. In a facility near Shijiazhuang:
• A 5-month course on special forces operations at the tactical-operational level. It has
been attended by officers from Uruguay
for at least the past 2 years, and perhaps by
members from other armed forces.
• A 5-month infantry company course, attended by an officer from Uruguay in 2010, and
perhaps others.
5. The Center of Military Instruction of the PLA
offers a course on martial arts which has been attended by Chilean Marines, among others.
Other Chinese military institutes which have hosted students from Latin American countries include
the following:
1. The Naval Research Institute, near Beijing,
which hosted a low-ranking officer from the Uruguayan Navy and perhaps others for a “masters” course
in naval radar and sonar, during an 11-month stay in
Beijing from 2008-09.
2. An institute in Beijing hosted two low-ranking
officers from the Uruguayan Air Force and perhaps
others during an 11-month stay in the city from 2008
to 2009:
• One for a “masters” course on aerial communication.
• One for a course on artillery repair.
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In parallel with these programs, Latin American
militaries also hosted Chinese officers. Examples include the following:
1. For several years, beginning in 2005, the Chilean Army language school hosted two Chinese professors for the Mandarin Chinese language,35 although
as of January 2011, these instructors were no longer
present.
2. In 2006, during a visit by a delegation from the
Chinese National Defense University, the Chilean war
college ANEPE signed an agreement regarding officer
exchanges and collaborative activities, although it has
not yet been ratified.
Chinese collaboration with Latin American militaries on education and training is increasingly extending to tactical-level programs as well. During the
November 2010 meeting between Chinese Defense
Minister Liang Guanglie and Colombian Defense Minister Rodrigo Rivera, an expansion of Sino-Colombian
military exchanges was agreed to, including the establishment of 10 places for Colombian generals and colonels in Chinese military academies, and the sending
of Colombian trainers to China for courses in sharpshooting, combat under-water diving, survival, and
riverine combat.36 Similarly, during General Liang’s
September meeting with Brazilian Defense Minister
Nelson Jobim, expanded cooperation between the two
countries in the area of basic training was discussed.37
In addition to opportunities for building personal
relationships and gathering intelligence, such tacticallevel courses also help the PRC to develop military
capabilities in areas which may be useful in working
more directly in the region’s unique operating environments.
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An additional element of China’s forming of military relationships with Latin America is institutional
visits. Such visits typically involve more people, but
are much shorter in duration than training exchanges.
Although the opportunities to develop personal ties
are by necessity more superficial, such institutional
visits allow the PRC to reach larger groups of personnel whose work touches many others, such as military
professors and mid-grade officers, while also building
or strengthening institution-to-institution linkages.
Examples include the following:
•	Visits between Chinese and Chilean naval officers have occurred on an occasional basis since
July 1996, but increased to one or two per year
starting in 2005.
•	In Argentina, there has been a similar increase
in recent years, including visits by Chinese officials to the Argentine National Defense University and the senior war colleges.
•	In Colombia, delegations from China’s National Defense University visit the nation’s war college on an annual basis.
Beyond institutional visits, other ongoing contacts
between Chinese and Latin American militaries include port visits by military training ships and warships by each side. The first such visit was made by
the Chilean Navy training ship Esmeralda to the port
of Shanghai in 1972. By 2009, the Esmeralda had made
10 trips to Chinese ports. Reciprocally, in April 1997,
the first Chinese naval flotilla visited Latin America.
It included the missile destroyers Harbin and Zhuhai
and the logistics ship Nancang, which made port calls
in Mexico, Peru, and Chile, as well as the U.S. base
at Pearl Harbor.38 The most recent such visit, at the
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time of this writing, came in 2009 from a Chinese naval flotilla which included the destroyer Shijiazhuang
and the supply ship Hongzehu, making port calls in
Valparaiso, Chile; Callao, Peru; and Guayaquil, Ecuador.39 Benign in character, such visits benefit the PLA
Navy, helping it to identify requirements for the use
of Latin American ports by its ships in the future for
maintenance, resupply, or other purposes.40
In addition to bilateral contacts, such as those
mentioned above, Chinese and Latin American militaries have occasional contact through conferences
and other forums. The Chilean and Chinese navies,
for example, have regular contact through the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, with the PRC having
supported Chile’s admission to the organization.41 The
Chinese, for their part, host various forums to which
Latin American officers are invited, including an annual “symposium for upper level officers” in Beijing,
which has been held at least five times. In addition,
from November to December 2007 in the city of Qingdao, the headquarters of the PLA North Sea fleet, the
Chinese held a seminar on the management of search
and rescue operations in which a Uruguayan naval
lieutenant and perhaps other Latin American military
officers were present.
It is also important to mention Chinese military actions in Latin America which are important primarily
at the symbolic level. These include one on September
16, 2010, when an honor guard of 34 persons from the
PLA participated, alongside representatives from 15
other countries, in a parade in Mexico City in commemoration of the 200th Anniversary of Mexico’s independence from Spain.42
Finally, military-to-military contacts also have
come to include joint exercises. In November 2010,39
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Chinese military personnel participated with 50 Peruvians in the humanitarian exercise Angel de la Paz,
including deployment to the village of Villa Maria
del Trunfo to perform medical services for the local
population.43 The joint exercise simulated a response
by the two armed forces to an earthquake, with an associated chemical fire,44 and was tied to the donation
by the PLA to the Peruvian military of a mobile field
hospital and training of the recipients on its use in the
facilities of the 1st Special Forces Brigade in Chorrillos, near Lima.45
While not threatening in and of itself, Chinese participation in a humanitarian exercise in Latin America
may be understood as a logical step toward its participation in the response to an actual disaster, outside the framework of a multilateral force such as the
UN. Such an offer of direct military involvement in
a Latin American country would put U.S. policymakers in an awkward position, since publicly blocking
humanitarian assistance from the PRC could be construed as increasing the number of Latin American
deaths from the disaster in order to keep the Chinese
military “out of the U.S. backyard.” The U.S. response
to future PRC offers of direct military humanitarian
assistance should thus be considered carefully by U.S.
policymakers before they occur.
Military Sales to Latin America.
As with military sales by other countries, Chinese military sales to Latin America help the PRC to
strengthen its ties with the purchasers by meeting their
specific needs, and by tying those nations logistically
to Chinese maintenance and training infrastructures.
Such transactions also help the PRC to develop and
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sustain its own national defense industry, and earn
export sales revenues.
Innocent or not, Chinese arms sales to Latin America are arguably one of the most closely watched facets
of China’s engagement with Latin America. Although
U.S. leaders such as Assistant Secretary of Defense
Frank Mora have observed that Chinese arms sales
can contribute to security in the hemisphere,46 many
politicians and other policymakers look at such sales
as indications that Chinese activities in the region constitute a threat to U.S. national security.
In general, PRC military sales to Latin America
have followed the pattern of its commercial sales. The
first Chinese defense goods sold in the region were
relatively inexpensive, unsophisticated items such as
military clothing and personal equipment. In some
cases, such goods entered Latin American militaries
as donations, such as the annual $1 million dollars
worth of hats, gloves, and other nonlethal equipment
donated by the PLA to Colombia. Frequently, Chinese
goods have been offered by third party importers,
representing companies such as the China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) in the PRC, but licensed to do business with Latin American militaries.
As with commercial goods, China’s ability to sell
sophisticated military hardware to Latin America
has been impeded by concerns over quality, as well
as the difficulty of maintaining and supporting the
equipment. Such concerns have been particularly
acute with respect to materiel such as ships, aircraft,
armored vehicles, weapons, and communication systems, regarding which lives on the battlefield could
depend on the proper functioning of the equipment.
The lack of a Chinese military presence in the region
has compounded such concern; the absence of sales
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of Chinese gear in Latin America meant that Chinese
military goods were “unproven” in the region, and
thus more difficult to sell. Moreover, without a Chinese military presence in the region, maintenance and
obtaining spare parts for Chinese goods were, in the
minds of many leaders, a great risk.47
Despite such obstacles, as in the commercial realm,
with time, the PRC and its defense companies have begun to move up the value-added chain to sell increasingly sophisticated military goods in Latin America.
In doing so, it has exploited opportunities provided
by regimes hostile to the United States, such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, whose political orientation and inability to acquire Western military technology have led them to look to Chinese equipment.
The first major breakthrough for the PRC in making
military sales to Latin America was arguably Venezuela’s 2008 announcement that it would purchase K-8
(Karakorum) aircraft, co-developed with Pakistan.48
Venezuela’s decision to purchase the aircraft was
driven in part by its inability to purchase U.S. fighters,
or spare parts for its existing fleet of U.S. aircraft, as
well as successful U.S. efforts to block other Western
countries from selling to Venezuela similar aircraft
that incorporated U.S. technology.49 The agreement
to ultimately purchase a total of 18 K-8 aircraft from
China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Corporation (CATIC), along with armaments and a
supporting logistics package, was made in August
2008. In the second half of 2009, 11 Venezuelan pilots
and 56 technicians were sent to China for training on
the aircraft as pilots and maintenance and logistics
support staff.50
The first 6 K-8s were officially received in March
2010,51 with the other 12 arriving in August. They
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were assigned to the 12th Fighter Air Group, based
at the air base Rafael Urdaneta de Maracaibo, and to the
15th Special Operations group, at the air base Vicente
Landaeta Gil de Barquisimeto.52 As a result of Venezuelan satisfaction with the transaction, the number of
K-8s desired was expanded to 40. In addition, the
Venezuelan military leadership has been evaluating
the more capable Chinese L-15 Air King, with a proposal by Hongdu Aviation Industry Corporation to
sell the Venezuelans 24 of the aircraft.53
Despite highly positive statements by the Venezuelan leadership regarding the K-8s, and the increase
of the purchase to 40 aircraft, the acquisition has had
its problems. In January 2010, one of the K-8s piloted
by a newly trained Venezuelan crashed on takeoff at
the military airport in Barquismetro, near Caracas.54
While the Chinese blamed improper maintenance by
the recently trained Venezuelans, the Venezuelans
pointed the finger at the Chinese for poor translations
of the aircraft technical manuals into Spanish. Beyond
fighters, the government has also declared that it will
purchase 10-12 Y-8 Chinese medium military transport aircraft, each capable of carrying up to 88 persons
or 20 tons of cargo.55
With the support of President Hugo Chavez,
purchases of Chinese equipment by the Venezuelan
armed forces also expanded into other areas. In 2005
the Venezuelan air force acquired JYL-1 radars, usable
for air defense, from the firm China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC), at a
cost of $150 million.56 The radars were acquired by the
Venezuelan organization Compañía Anónima Venezolana de Industrias Militares (CAVIM), with the first
delivered in January 2008 and subsequently put under
the command of the Venezuelan Air Force. They were
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used publicly for the first time in 2008 in an exercise
with Brazil.57
The Chinese also installed a command and control
center for the Venezuelan radars at a military base near
Caracas at the end of 2008. Between April and August
2008, Venezuela sent a total of 70 officers to the PRC
for training on the operation and maintenance of the
system.58 By mid-2009, the Venezuelan military leadership was referring to a total of 10 Chinese radars as
being operational.59 Moreover, as of June 2009, Venezuela was evaluating the purchase of other Chinese
radars to complement the capabilities of the JYL-1s.60
In addition to the radars and aircraft, the Venezuelans have also spearheaded the introduction of
Chinese command and control equipment into Latin
America, with the Venezuelan defense organization
DICOFAN working with the Chinese civilian telecommunications firm Huawei to implement the system.61
In support of the system, China has funded a training
program executed by Huawei for students of the Venezuelan military institute Universidad Nacional Experimental Politécnica de las Fuerzas Armadas (UNEFA),62 as
well as construction of a $54 million laboratory in the
Venezuelan Armed forces technical university Instituto Universitario Militar de Comunicaciones y Electrónicas
de las Fuerzas Armadas (IUMCOELFA).
Despite press accounts which suggest that Chinese
military sales in Latin America have been relatively
limited, by the end of 2010, the Venezuelan military
leadership was evaluating purchase of a broad range
of Chinese systems, including such command and
control systems as high frequency (HF), ultra high
frequency (UHF), and very high frequency (VHF)
communications systems; IGLA missile systems; antiaircraft guns; biodegradable mines; water purification
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equipment; bridging equipment; utility aircraft; antisubmarine aircraft; ground-attack aircraft; long-range
sea surveillance aircraft; costal patrol aircraft; frigates;
submarines; and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters.
Beyond purchases of PRC military hardware,
Venezuelan officials have also reportedly facilitated
indirect purchases of military goods by criminal and
insurgent groups such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). An investigation by
the Colombian prosecutor’s office, for example, implicated the Venezuelan government official Amílcar
Figueroa, who presented a shopping list of weapons
for the FARC during his visit to the weapons manufacturer NORINCO in the PRC.63
In addition to direct purchases of military goods
and systems from the PRC, Venezuela has greatly facilitated the ability by the PRC to sell its military end
items to other, like-minded governments in the region,
including both Ecuador and Bolivia. Following the lead
of Venezuela, in September 2009 Ecuador negotiated
a deal with the PRC for two radars, manufactured by
China Electronics Technology Corporation (CETC), to
be deployed to its northern frontier with Colombia for
evaluation, with the option to purchase an additional
four units.64 Although there were problems with the
suitability of the first radars for the operating conditions they encountered, in August 2010 the Ecuadoran
government announced that it was going ahead with
the purchase of the four additional radars, at a cost of
$80 million, and would begin taking delivery on them
by the end of the year.65
In addition to the radars, Ecuador has acquired
MA-60 medium transport aircraft from the PRC. The
first two aircraft acquisitions were in 2006.66 Ecuador
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continues to flirt with the purchase of more Chinese
mid-sized transport aircraft. In July 2009, Ecuadoran
Defense Minister Javier Ponce noted Ecuadoran interest in purchasing four military aircraft from the PRC
for $60 million to replace its aging fleet of Brazilian
Avro military transport aircraft.67 Although no purchases immediately followed the declarations, during
the February 2010 visit to China by Chairman of the
Ecuadoran Joint Chiefs of Staff General Fabian Varela,
the PRC mentioned that it was investigating the possibility of providing Ecuador with four MA-60s68 at a
price of $80 million.69 Subsequently, in August 2010,
Ponce announced that he was sending a delegation to
the PRC to negotiate the purchase of two of the MA60s for $38 million, to be delivered by the end of the
year,70 although there have been no further reports in
the press on the status of the transaction.
In addition to these transactions, the PRC has donated military trucks and ambulances and other nonlethal goods to Ecuador. Indeed, during the February
2010 visit by General Varela to the PRC, China announced that it planned to double such donations.71
Like Ecuador, Bolivia has followed the lead of Venezuela in acquiring military equipment from the PRC.
Prompted in part by the personal recommendation of
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to his colleague
Evo Morales in October 2009, Bolivian Defense Minister Walker San Miguel announced the planned purchase of a squadron (6) of Chinese K-8 aircraft for $58
million.72 The aircraft are to be deployed in the vicinity of Cochabamba for counterdrug interception missions, and represent the first combat aircraft acquired
by the Bolivian military.73 The deal was financed with
a 25-year concessional credit, with the aircraft to be
delivered over the course of 18 months beginning in
April 2010.74
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Although the K-8s are Bolivia’s first fighters, they
are Bolivia’s second transaction with the PRC involving aircraft for its military. In March 2007, Bolivia announced the leasing of two MA-60 military cargo and
passenger aircraft from the PRC, as part of a larger
deal that included the acquisition of military transport
aircraft from Venezuela.75 The Chinese MA-60 aircraft
were paid for by a $38.3 million loan from the PRC76
and delivered in February 2008.
In addition to its purchase of end-items, Bolivia
has also received a series of donations of other military goods from the PRC. These donations have come
in four major installments: In December 2006, the
PRC announced the donation to Bolivia of 25-person assault craft, infantry and artillery munitions,
night-vision goggles, and kevlar helmets.77 In 2007,
the Bolivian armed forces received 34 trucks from the
manufacturer First Auto Works (FAW), five busses,
three Toyota Land Cruiser SUVs, and a tow truck.78 In
February 2009, it received 2 gunboats from the PRC.79
In March 2010, it received 27 busses for military transport, manufactured by the Chinese company Hinger,
21 Nissan light trucks, and 40 Yamaha outboard motors.80 Beyond these items, over the period 1987-96, the
PRC also reportedly provided 10,000 AK-47 assault
rifles,81 in addition to having donated motorcycles, bicycles, and other gear to the Bolivian police.
Although the most significant arms transactions
between the PRC and Latin America have come in
the “socialist” countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for
the Americas (ALBA) bloc—Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Honduras, Dominica, Ecuador, plus a
few small island nations—significant advances and
near-advances have occurred in other countries as
well. In 2009, Peru almost became the first nation in
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Latin America to make a major purchase of armored
vehicles from the PRC. A series of five Chinese MBT2000 tanks were accepted from the PRC for evaluation
by the Peruvian army, and were featured prominently
in a military parade in December 2009.82 The purchase
came under significant criticism within Peru, and was
eventually canceled by the Minister of Defense in the
interest of dedicating more resources to fighting narcotraffickers and recouping the state presence in the
Apurimac and Ene valley region (VRAE) in the interior of the country.83
As noted previously, in 2010 Peru was also the recipient of the first major donation of military humanitarian equipment from the PLA, with the delivery of
a mobile field hospital and other equipment during
the second half of 2010, having a total value of $300
million, including training of Peruvian personnel on
the equipment, and culminating in a joint ChinesePeruvian humanitarian exercise in November of that
year. At a lower level, Peru has also purchased Chinese nonlethal equipment, and in 2007 signed defense
accords with the Chinese to allow them to participate
more directly in the Peruvian military acquisition system.84
However, Peru has not been the only U.S. ally in
the region to consider major purchases of Chinese
military equipment. Since as early as 2006, Chinese
military officials have discussed the possibility of
selling armored vehicles and other equipment to the
Colombian military.85 To date, Colombia has not pursued such transactions, in part due to concern over
complications in the maintenance and support of such
equipment, and also because of the close ColombiaU.S. defense and security relationship.
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Beyond explicit military sales, the Uruguayan police, the Peruvian National Police (PNP), and perhaps
other police forces in the region have explored purchases of Chinese equipment. The police force in Montevideo, for example, has purchased police cruisers of
the Chinese brand, Geeley.86 Similarly, in August 2007
the PNP contracted with a South Korean intermediary for the purchase of 700 Geeley police cars.87 As
with the military sales, however, the transaction came
under significant public scrutiny and was eventually
canceled.
At a lower level, the Colombian military has also
been the recipient of approximately $1 million per year
of nonlethal equipment, including gloves and winter
hats to equip Colombian high-mountain battalions. It
affirmed and deepened that relationship in November 2010 with the signing of a defense cooperation
accord.88
Costa Rica is also a strong candidate for the receipt
of Chinese equipment and other assistance for its security forces. In November 2010, during a visit to Beijing, Costa Rican Prime Minister Rene Castro made a
formal request to China for assistance in training and
equipping its national police for operations against
narcotrafficking.89
Other countries in the region have also flirted with
the possibility of acquiring significant military material from the Chinese. These include Argentina, which
in 2007 was reportedly considering purchase of the
Chinese X-11 helicopter90 as well as military trucks
and radars to provide coverage for the Northern frontier.91 It ultimately decided not to purchase any of
these from the PRC.
The Argentine military did, however, agree to purchase WMZ-551 wheeled armored vehicles from the
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Chinese manufacturer NORINCO as part of its contribution of a mechanized battalion to the joint Argentine-Chilean peacekeeping force “Cruz del Sur.” In
2008, the Argentine Joint Staff purchased four of the
armored vehicles for evaluation at a price of $2.6 million, including a training and spare parts package.92
The vehicles initially saw service with the Argentine
mechanized battalion in Gonaives, Haiti, where the
Argentine combined mechanized battalion was deployed as part of MINUSTAH.93 In the end, however,
numerous problems with these vehicles led Argentina
to suspend their procurement.94
In the case of Brazil, which has its own well-developed defense industry, there have been no significant
purchases of Chinese military hardware. Nonetheless,
the possibility of China-Brazil co-production of such
items was discussed during the September 2010 meeting between Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie and his Brazilian counterpart, Nelson Jobim, in
Brasilia.95
Although Chile has made significant military purchases in general, it has not, to date, made significant
purchases of Chinese military goods. As with Colombia, this resistance reflects Chile’s close military
institutional ties with the United States, including an
existing military infrastructure built around U.S. and
European equipment, as well as a relative emphasis on
quality, over price—a luxury permitted in part thanks
to its large military acquisition budget, which receives
10 percent of export revenues from the state mining
firm Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (COLDELCO), per the 1976 Copper Reserves Law.96
Finally, PRC donations of military equipment to
Jamaica in January 2011 deserve mention. The delivery of $3.5 million in nonlethal goods, principally uni-
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forms and tents, but also including helmets, binoculars, backpacks, and bulletproof vests to the Jamaica
Defense Force (JDF) was based on a 2008 defense cooperation agreement between the two countries.97 Although the donation was small in absolute terms, and
did not involve weapon platforms or sophisticated
munitions, it is significant because of the small size
of the JDF, and because it came at a time in which the
overtaxed Jamaican security forces were evaluating
new ways of dealing with narco-violence such as that
which killed 73 persons during the forced entry into
Tivoli Gardens to capture Dudus Coke in May 2010.
Such gifts, in combination with Chinese experience in
neighboring Haiti, potentially position the PRC to expand its role in police-related activities among those
nations that recognize the PRC in the Caribbean.
There have also been some suggestions that Chinese small arms have made their way into the arsenals
of Latin American countries. For example, a version of
the Colt M-4 rifle, manufactured by the Chinese arms
conglomerate NORINCO as the CQ-M4, was reportedly spotted in 2008 photos of activities by the Paraguayan armed forces.98
Chinese military sales to non-state actors in the
region also deserve mention. In addition to the previously discussed sale of Chinese arms to the FARC
and other anti-governmental groups, a significant
portion of the military-caliber weapons purchased by
narcotrafficking organizations in Mexico are Chinese
in origin, albeit purchased through third-party arms
dealers.99
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Military-Relevant Commercial Interactions in Latin
America.
In addition to arms sales and contacts between the
PLA and Latin American militaries, select commercial
interactions must be considered as part of its military
engagement because of the impact they confer upon
Chinese military capabilities and its strategic posture
globally. Although virtually all commercial interactions indirectly contribute to the resources and technological capability of the Chinese state, this section
focuses on three strategic commercial areas whose
military benefits are most explicit: aircraft, satellites,
and telecommunications.
Chinese sales of aircraft to Latin America, as well
as collaboration in aircraft manufacturing, benefit the
Chinese military aviation industry. Both major cases
of their collaboration involve the group Aviation Industry of China (AVIC), a holding company for CAIC
I and II, also involved in the development of military
aircraft and associated technology.
In the Brazilian case, CAIC collaborated with the
Brazilian aircraft manufacturing firm Embraer to
jointly manufacture the mid-sized ERJ-145 jet in the
Chinese city of Harbin. Embraer viewed collaboration
with CAIC as necessary in order to gain access to the
Chinese market, although by 2010 the relationship
had broken down, with the PRC resisting Embraer requests to move beyond the ERJ-145s and sell the larger
E-190 to the Chinese market.100 The relationship was
also soured by the perception within Embraer that the
Chinese had used the partnership to steal Embraer’s
technology to support their own aircraft development
initiatives.
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In the case of Venezuela, in April 2010, the two
governments signed an agreement for the establishment of a new mid-sized airline to serve rural Venezuela.101 China Development Bank agreed to lend the
Venezuelan government $300 million to establish a regional airline. In return, the Venezuelan government
would purchase the 33 aircraft for the airline, Y-12s,
from AVIC.102
Satellites and space technology are other areas
whose technology has both significant commercial and
military applications for the PRC. Today, concurrent
with the economic and technological development
of the PRC, the Chinese space program is pursuing
a diverse array of objectives, ranging from commercial satellite launches, to manned space flight (Project
921),103 to missions to the moon,104 Mars, and beyond.
Within this broader context, the PRC is attempting
to secure a presence in the commercial satellite market. Under the supervision of China National Space
Agency (CNSA), space launches and related activities are executed by the state-owned enterprise China
Aerospace and Technology Corporation, with a series
of companies falling within this framework. These
include Great Wall Industry Corporation (GWIC),
the sole organization authorized by the Chinese Government to provide satellite in-orbit delivery (IOD)
services, commercial launch services, and aerospace
technology applications.105
The PRC currently has four major ongoing spacerelated projects in Latin America: the China-Brazil
Earth Research Satellite (CBERS); Venesat-1; the Venezuelan Remote Sensing Satellite (VRSS); and the Tupac Katari satellite, as well as other projects in development and more modest collaborative initiatives.
The primary venue for China-Brazil space cooperation is the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite pro33

gram, established in 1998. To date, a total of three satellites have been launched through the program from
the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi, China,
in 1999, 2003, and 2007.106 A fourth launch is scheduled in mid-2011.107 Brazil assumed approximately 30
percent of the project cost, while China assumed the
remaining 70 percent, including ground stations.108
The importance of the project in the broader BrazilChina relationship is evidenced by the fact that a key
stop during President Hu’s visit to Brazil in November 2004 was to a CBERS project site at the National
Institute for Space Research (INPE) in the state of Sao
Paulo.109
The China-Brazil space collaboration via the CBERS
program has not been without problems. The launch
of the first joint satellite, originally scheduled for 1992,
was delayed until 1998.110 Moreover, in August 2003,
the first CBERS satellite experienced a malfunction
that put an end to all of its data transmissions, and in
April 2005 one of two PRC-supplied imaging devices
on the second CBERS satellite stopped working due to
a power supply failure.111
Such difficulties have not, however, significantly
impeded China-Brazil space cooperation.112 Upon assuming his post in March 2008, the new head of the
Brazilian Space Agency stated that Brazil cherished its
ties with the PRC and would deepen its cooperation
with China in the field of space technology.113 In the
cases of Venezuela and Bolivia, the PRC has contracted to develop and launch satellites, to build associated
ground control stations, and to train personnel in their
use.
Venezuela was the first country in Latin America to
pay a Chinese company, GWIC, to develop and launch
a satellite.114 Venezuela paid the PRC $406 million for
the project, including $241 million to develop and put
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it into space.115 As part of the project, the Chinese also
built a series of ground control stations, including facilities at Camatagua and El Sombrero (the “Manuel
Rios” military base). In addition, 90 Venezuelans were
sent to the PRC for education and training associated
with the project, including 15 technicians sent for a
12-month doctoral-level program, and an additional
15 sent for a shorter program to obtain their master’s
degrees.
The satellite was launched from the PRC in October 2008 and put into a 78-degree geosynchronous
orbit, becoming operational in January 2009.116 It initially had problems due to an irregular orbit, requiring adjustments from booster rockets that ultimately
consumed a significant percentage of its operational
life. Venezuela has discussed plans to launch a second
satellite in 2013, the VRSS, which would conduct reconnaissance.117
In the case of Bolivia, on April 2, 2010, the government of Evo Morales contracted with the Chinese
Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation
(CASC) for the development and launch of the Tupac
Katari satellite.118 As in the Venezuelan case, the Bolivian project also included the construction of ground
control stations: one in Pampahasi and one in La
Guardia in the department of Santa Cruz.119 Of the total $295 million cost of the program, all but $44 million
was financed by credit from the China Development
Bank.120
In addition to their contributions to the enhancement of the PRC space capability, China’s construction of ground control stations and tying them into
national telecommunication networks gives it unprecedented opportunities to understand the communication and space-technical architectures of each host
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country, and to tap into them in the future, if necessary, to collect information or disrupt them. In the case
of Venezuela, it is relevant that the Chinese telecommunication company Huawei plays an intimate role
not only in the construction of the satellite command
and control facility, but also in the construction of the
Venezuelan fiber optic network.121
From a military perspective, the utility of projects
such as those with Brazil, Venezuela, and Bolivia, is
that they help major Chinese companies in their bid
to become a commercially viable space launch and
technology provider, in competition with established
providers such as Ariane and Thales. Moreover, associated training of Latin American personnel in the
PRC arguably provides China the opportunity to
build relationships with, collect information from,
and in some degree indoctrinate virtually the entire
cadre of the recipient country’s military and civilian
space-technical personnel.
As part of the development of its space sector, the
PRC has also been pursuing initiatives in Argentina,
Chile, and Peru, albeit with mixed success. With respect to Argentina, in May 2005 the Chinese government signed an agreement to provide technical support
and equipment to the national satellite manufacturer
Investigaciones Aplicadas (INVAP) in support of the
development of a satellite by the Argentine national
company Empresa Argentina de Soluciones Satelitales
(ARSAT).122 In the end, however, Astrium and Thales
Alenia Space, rather than the PRC, were selected as
the major equipment suppliers to INVAP. Moreover,
although the PRC was interested in providing Argentina with launch services, ARSAT contracted with the
French firm Arianespace to launch the satellite in mid2012 from the equatorial launch site in New Guinea.123
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In the case of Chile, China expressed an interest in participating in the development and launch of Chile’s
first satellite, the Sistema Satelital de Observación de la
Tierra (SSOT).124 But when the final decision was made,
the development work was awarded to the European
firm EADS Astrium,125 and the launch contract won by
Arianespace.
In the case of Peru, the nation is currently the only
Latin American member of the Asia-Pacific Space
Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a Beijing-based
entity which began functioning in 2008, focusing on
space science and technology, training, and cooperative research.126
In Mexico, the April 2010 legislation establishing a
Mexican Space Agency127 opened a window for ChinaMexico space cooperation, with a delegation from the
China National Space Agency participating in the new
organization’s kickoff event, the “Space Conference of
the Americas,” held in November 2010 in the Mexican
state of Hidalgo.128
With respect to telecommunications, another sector with strategic value in the information operations
and defense technology realm, Chinese firms are major players in virtually every major nation in Central
and South America. The principal companies involved
are Huawei, ZTE Corporation, and to a lesser extent
Shanghai Alcatel Bell. Both Huawei and ZTE have
established regional hubs for operations and training
in Brazil. Both have participated in various projects
in the modernization and expansion of major South
American telecommunications architectures, including those of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela.129
In the cases of both Huawei and ZTE, Venezuela
presented the companies, and the PRC, with a major
commercial opportunity, with each establishing a cell
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phone manufacturing facility in the country, with
plans to export production from the factories into
other parts of the region.130 In addition, Huawei has
played a major role in building Venezuela’s fiber optic
network, and has been involved in a series of military
projects as noted earlier, such as the establishment of
a command and control facility, and the training of
Venezuelan military personnel.
In the case of Shanghai Alcatel Bell, the company is
the principal contractor laying a new fiber optic cable
tying Cuba and Jamaica into the China-built Venezuela telecommunications infrastructure.131 In Honduras,
although the nation does not diplomatically recognize
the PRC, a Chinese consortium was reportedly interested in purchasing the state telecommunications firm
Empresa Hondureña de Telecomunicaciones (Hondutel),
pursuant to plans to privatize it.132
As in aviation and space, Chinese activities in telecommunications have strategic military implications
in two areas. First, they support Chinese efforts to acquire and improve technical capabilities in this strategically important sector. Second, as a complement to
space cooperation, when Chinese companies sell hardware and build the telecommunications infrastructure
in a region, the PRC is afforded opportunities to exploit
these networks for future information collection and
disruption activities in the unlikely but possible event
of a future conflict with the United States. Moreover,
such a presence makes possible the use of commercial
telecommunication offices and activities as cover for
the potential introduction of personnel into the region
and performance of information operations.
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Chinese Physical Presence within Latin America
with Military-Strategic Implications.
To date, the PRC has been extremely cautious to
avoid establishing an overt military presence in Latin
America that could facilitate the emergence of a consensus within the United States and its allies to oppose PRC engagement with the region. Where it has
done so, it has maintained a very low profile, or emphasized the scientific or nonmilitary character of that
presence.
As noted previously, the PRC has had military police in Haiti as part of the MINUSTAH peacekeeping
force since September 2004.133 Such participation has
arguably provided a valuable learning experience and
engagement opportunity for them. While far more
benign than other forms of presence, such as military
bases, its activities in Haiti allows the PRC to gain
experience and develop contacts in the region, while
fostering good will among Latin American militaries
that could facilitate its military access to the region in
the future.
In Cuba, the PRC reportedly has a physical presence at three or more Soviet-era monitoring facilities:
Lourdes, Bejucal,134 and Santiago de Cuba.135 With their
proximity to the United States, the bases are reportedly used by the Chinese for the collection of signals
intelligence, such as intercepting radio and cellphone
transmissions, and also for the operation of a cyber
espionage and training facility in the country.
In addition to their explicitly military presence in
Haiti and Cuba, the PRC also has a series of government-operated scientific bases in Antarctica, since establishing its first base there, “Great Wall,” in 1985.136
Although the sites are not of a military character, they
are supported by the PLA Navy, with the 1st Task
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Group established in 2004 for the specific purpose of
supporting the base and conducting operations in the
“southern ocean.”137 Although the frigid temperatures
and remoteness of its Antarctic facilities from the majority of Latin American states limit their military utility, as with Haiti they have provided opportunities
to interact with the Argentine and Chilean militaries.
The Chilean base in Antarctica, for example, is located in close physical proximity to that of the Chinese,
providing opportunities for communication and collaboration. In addition, some have speculated that the
PRC presence in Antarctica may strengthen its claim
to exploit mineral deposits there,138 particularly when
the current international treaty banning mining in
Antarctica expires in 2048.139
Beyond Haiti, Cuba, and Antarctica, the presence
of Chinese logistics companies in major ports of the
region arguably has some strategic military value, presenting a platform from which the PRC could smuggle people or material into the region under the cover
of commercial operations, in the event that relations
between the United States and the PRC significantly
worsen in the coming decades. Indeed, there is a precedent for the use of Chinese commercial shipping for
military purposes. In 1991, the PRC enlisted the help
of the commercial cargo ship Yongmen, owned by China Overseas Shipping Company (COSCO), to evacuate Chinese embassy personnel from Somalia.140
While it is important to acknowledge the long-term
strategic military value of the PRC physical presence
in Latin America, it is also necessary to put it in proper context. It would be very difficult for the PLA to
employ this commercial presence to support its own
projection of military power in the region, since com-
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mercial facilities cannot be readily transformed into
military bases. Moreover, the proximity to the United States of any improvised military facilities would
make them highly vulnerable to military action in the
event of overt hostilities. Nonetheless, in such a worst
case scenario, such a presence would arguably allow
the PRC to more easily deny the use of those facilities
in the future by U.S. and allied warships, or to disrupt
commercial flows that support the United States. The
possibility that the firm Hutchison-Whampoa could
use its port operations at Cristobal and Balboa in the
Panama Canal Zone to close the canal to U.S. warships
is illustrative.141
CONCLUSIONS
The PRC military relationship with Latin America
is not as insignificant as much of the current discourse
suggests, yet the challenges that it presents are often
mischaracterized as a “China threat” to the region.
From a U.S. national security perspective, the most
important dimensions of China’s military engagement with Latin America have to do with how the relationship is evolving as the PRC pursues its arguably
legitimate national security interests, while remaining
attentive to the United States, the most important strategic actor in the region. Chinese military interactions
with Latin America, in and of themselves, are not necessarily a problem. The risk stems from what happens
when the PRC, like the United States, is confronted
with imperatives to protect its growing interests in
the region in the face of organized crime or political
turmoil that threaten its people, investments in Latin
America, or commercial flows. Obviously, such disruption could in the future cause serious damage to the

41

Chinese economy. Equally troubling is how Chinese
capital and weaponry could be used by regimes in the
region hostile to their neighbors and the United States,
or by terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations. The principal risk is that such groups might
acquire such weapons due to inadequate controls over
them by the region’s governments, or because of inadequate attention by Chinese companies regarding
their weapons’ ultimate customers. Chinese arms sales
and the PRC physical presence in Latin America also
become problematic in the event that U.S.-China relations degenerate, creating the paradox that U.S. fears
over how such weapons and ties could be used would
contribute to the very friction that could increase the
possibility of their use.
Aside from such scenarios, even in the best of cases
growing China-Latin America military engagement
means that the United States will find its freedom of
action in the region constrained in ways that were not
the case in the past. Latin America is increasingly acquiring options beyond those offered by the United
States, particularly as regarding its security cooperation, arms purchases, and personnel training. This
dynamic will change how the region’s governments
bargain when it comes to access to bases, intelligence
sharing, joint operations, and permission for U.S. direct action in the region, for example, counterdrug
and counterterrorism operations. At a minimum,
Latin American regimes will be more likely to resist
agreeing to U.S. requests that are perceived to violate
their sovereignty.
Based on its behavior to date, it is likely that the
PRC will continue to expand its military engagement
with Latin America, including arms sales, which will
increase in volume and sophistication, building on the
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demonstration of its equipment in the ALBA countries, capitalizing on key breakthrough transactions
when they occur—whether with Peru and Colombia,
or elsewhere—in order to introduce end items into
the mainstream arms market of the region. In following this course, although the PRC will likely remain
highly attentive to the U.S. response, it is also likely to
become bolder over time, particularly as the current
4th generation Chinese leadership is superseded by
younger leaders who have grown up in a PRC that is
an accepted political and economic power, confident
of its place in the world.
What Should the United States Do?
Growing Chinese military contacts with Latin
America are, in some ways, an understandable part
of the expansion of the PRC as key global actor with
global interests. Although the example of Japan suggests that a country that builds its economic power on
international commerce in the modern era does not
necessarily have to develop security ties with its trading partners, China seems bent on developing such
ties.
As a long-standing military partner of Latin America, the United States has an opportunity to forge a
new type of partnership with countries of the region,
to help them exploit the opportunities and avoid the
pitfalls that military and other forms of engagement
with the PRC present. Indeed, as an integral part of
the region through geographic, economic, and human
ties, the United States has an obligation to itself and to
its neighbors in Latin America to forge this new type
of partnership.
Because of the importance of the United States for
the PRC as a source of technology and as a market,
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and because of the damage that animosity with the
United States could do to the economic and technological development of the PRC, Chinese leaders have
traditionally been very sensitive to possible adverse
U.S. responses to their initiatives. The PRC is unlikely
to bow before U.S. demands, yet the character of the
U.S. response, among other factors, will shape how
the PRC and its companies behave in Latin America
and the pace at which they proceed.
Such analysis is not intended to imply that the
United States should initiate a new “Monroe Doctrine,” telling the PRC to “stay out” of the region. Although such rhetoric might play well politically, and
although it might induce China to proceed more cautiously in the short term, it would also work against
U.S. strategic interests in the long term by strengthening the hand of more conservative forces in the PRC,
and by fueling accusations in Latin America that its
powerful neighbor to the north is “once again” trying
to interfere with the sovereign right of countries in the
region to maintain relations with whom they choose.
Beyond such a likely negative reaction from the
region, trying to prevent the PRC from establishing
military ties with Latin America would also deny the
United States some of the real benefits that may be
realized from Chinese military engagement with the
region. To the extent that it proves reliable, for example, Chinese military hardware and supplies, in addition to training programs, may provide the region
with cost-effective ways to meet security needs in the
face of serious threats, such as those posed by transnational criminal organizations.142 Cooperation between
the PRC and Latin American police forces with data,
personnel exchanges, and translation support, could
be of great benefit in combating the activities of mafias
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operating in Latin America with ties to PRC criminal
enterprises such as the Red Dragon, with its involvement in human trafficking networks in the region143—
or in stemming the flow of precursor chemicals from
China to cocaine laboratories in the Andes and Amazon jungle.144 Revenue from export sales to China, if
carefully managed, may also help Latin American
states meet their security needs, as seen in the case of
Chile, where by law, 10 percent of copper export revenues are channeled to fund defense modernization.145
Given both the positive and negative attributes
of Chinese military engagement with the region, the
United States should work to obtain greater transparency with regard to those activities, and to engage
the PRC in a positive fashion regarding its pursuits
in the hemisphere, including regular dialogue and the
establishment of mechanisms for resolving misunderstanding. To this extent, the decision by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela to resume
the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue on Latin America146
initiated by his predecessor, Thomas Shannon, was a
constructive move.
As a complement to transparency, the United
States must also improve its understanding of the
dangers and the threats presented by that engagement in the specific, evolving Latin American context.
Scenario-based gaming could play an important role
in such analysis by generating insight with respect
to how political crises and other potential future dynamics in the region could play out, with a particular
focus on crises that threaten specific PRC interests in
the region, and options for the PRC to protect those
interests in unilateral as well as collaborative ways.
Such analysis should also focus on how different actors in the region might react to the presence of China,
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including its indirectly applied pressures, and how
the commercial and other interests in Latin America
of such actors as Russia, Iran, and India might play
into the unfolding dynamic.
Overall, it is important for the United States to forge
its response to PRC military engagement with the region in strategic terms, considering both the long-term
implications of Chinese actions, as well as how that
response affects the U.S. position among the countries
of the region. Chinese military engagement with Latin
America is likely to be a growing and enduring part of
the regional dynamic. How the United States adapts
and reacts to that reality will have profound implications for the future security environment of the region,
and the position of the United States within it.
ENDNOTES
1. “Full text: China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the
Caribbean.” China View, Beijing, China, November 5, 2008, available from news.xinhuanet.com.
2. For an example of the controversy, see “Panama Canal:
America’s strategic artery,” BBC News, December 8, 1999, available from news.bbc.co.uk. See also Nelson Chung, “US faces surprise attack with canal giveaway: Analyst,” Global Security, November 17, 1999, available from www.globalsecurity.org.
3. See, for example, Kevin P. Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, The Dragon in the Room, Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2010.
4. See Murray Scott Tanner, “How China Manages Internal
Security Challenges and Its Impact on PLA Missions,” in Roy
Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the
Strait: PLA Missions Other than Taiwan, Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April, 2009, p. 52.

46

5. See “II. National Defense Policy,” available from www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194485.htm.
6. David Lai and Mark Miller, “Introduction,” in Kamphausen, Lai, and Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait, p. 16.
7. See, for example, Editorial, “On the PLA’s Historical Mission in the New Stage of the New Century,” Jiefangjun Bao, January 9, 2006. For references on calls for the PLA to create a “strategic deterrent force” to protect its interests abroad, see PLA Daily
editorial, “On the Military’s New Mission in the New Century,”
January 9, 2006. Also see Luo Yabo, “A Scientific Interpretation of
the PLA’s New Mission in the New Century,” Theoretical Studies
on PLA Political Work, Vol. 6, No. 3, June 2005. For a good overview of the debate over how the PLA should defend its interests
abroad, see Lai and Miller, “Introduction,” in Kamphausen, Lai,
and Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait.
8. “Petrolera china desestima que protesta en Tarapoa haya
afectado sus intereses,” El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, November 16, 2006, available from www.eluniverso.com. See also “Andes
Strikes Deal, Ends Tarapoa Protests,” Rigzone, November 14, 2006,
available from www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=38140.
9. “Heridos 24 militares en incidentes en protestas en Orellana,” El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, July 5, 2007, available from
www.eluniverso.com.
10. “Corredor logístico Manta-Manaos generará nuevas industrias locales,” El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, May 6, 2007,
available from www.eluniverso.com.
11. “Los camioneros ratifican el boicot a los super y autoservicios chinos,” Clarin, Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 26, 2006, available from www.clarin.com.
12. Yolanda Ojeda Reyes, “Ciudanos chinos reciben protección,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, November 11, 2004, available from www.eluniversal.com.
13. With global warming in the future, this could also include
the Straits of Magellan.

47

14. Christopher D. Young and Ross Rustici, “China’s Out of
Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles and
Potential Solutions,” China Strategic Perspectives, No. 3, Washington DC: National Defense University Press, December 2010.
15. Song Xiaojun, “Will China Send Forces to Somalia?” Blog
commentary, December 1, 2008.
16. Lai and Miller, “Introduction,” in Kamphausen, Lai, and
Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait.
17. Information Office of the State Council, China’s National
Defense in 2008, Beijing, China, available from www.china.org.cn/
government/central_government/2009-01/20/content_17155577.htm.
See also Information Office of the State Council, China’s National
Defense in 2006, Beijing, China, December 29, 2006.
18. For a good discussion of the Chinese approach towards
“asymmetric warfare,” see Nichalos R. Reisdorff, “Winning the
Hundred Battles: China and Asymmetric Warfare,” Master's Thesis, ADA430913, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, June 6, 2003.
19. “Bolivia y China fortalecen cooperación militar,” Los Tiempos, Cochabamba, Bolivia, August 18, 2010, available from www.
lostiempos.com.
20. “Militares Cubanos Visitan China” (“Cuban Military Visits China”), Cuba a la Mano, September 4, 2010, available from cubaalamano.net.
21. “Saludan fortalecimiento de cooperación militar entre
Fuerzas Armadas de Perú y China,” Andina, Novembeer 23, 2010,
available from www.andina.com/pe.
22. “China dona US$1 millón a Colombia para armamentos,”
ABC, Asunción, Paraguay, September 6, 2010, available from
www.abc.com.py.
23. “Brazil seeks closer defense relationship with China: defense minister,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, September
30, 2010, available from english.people.com.
48

24. “Chinese, Brazilian DMs hold talks on military cooperation,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, September 9, 2010,
available from english.people.com.
25. “Chinese military open to more int’l cooperation: senior
officer,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, September 15, 2010,
available from english.people.com.cn.
26. “Ecuadoran defense minister meets with Chinese military
delegation,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, November 14,
2010, available from english.people.com.cn.
27. “Jefe del Estado Mayor chino está desde el martes en Venezuela,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, November 18, 2010,
available from www.eluniversal.com.
28. “China confirms death of all 8 Chinese police officers in
Haiti quake,” China View, January 17, 2010, available from www.
chinaview.cn. In the days following the earthquake, the PLA police
contingent was temporarily augmented by rescue workers and
other personnel from the PRC. “Chinese rescue team arrives in
Haiti, eight Chinese still missing,” Peoples Daily Online, Beijing,
China, January 14, 2010, available from english.people.com.cn.
29. “Chinese rescue team arrives in Haiti, eight Chinese still
missing.” The official list of casualties associated with MINUSTAH,
listing only four Chinese peacekeepers, can be found at MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, available from
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/memoriam.shtml.
An account of the collapse of the MINUSTAH headquarters can
be found at “UN Headquarters in Haiti Collapsed in Quake,”
CBS News, January 13, 2009, available from article.wn.com/
view/2010/01/13/UN_Haiti_headquarter_collapses_in_earthquake/.
30. “China further honors peacekeepers killed in Haiti earthquake,” Peoples Daily Online, Beijing, China, January 26, 2010,
available from english.people.com.cn.
31. See, for example, Florencia Jubany and Daniel Poon, “Recent Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: A
Canadian Perspective,” FOCAL, March 2006, available from www.
focal.ca/pdf/china_lat-am.pdf.
49

32. There may be separate Air Force and Navy versions of this
course.
33. The formal legal request to the Uruguayan Congress for
the Naval Captain Sergio Dos Santos to attend the year-long
course appears as Resolucion 56.547. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Montevideo, Uruguay, April 29, 2009.
34. “Simpósio Internacional no Naval Command College do
Exército Popular de Libertacão de China,” PlanoBrazil, December
18, 2010.
35. “Curso de Chino Mandarín,” Ejército de Chile, August
2, 2007, available from www.ejercito.cl/detalle_noticia.php?noticia
=3260.
36. “China dona US$1 millón a Colombia para armamentos,”
ABC, Asunción, Paraguay, September 6, 2010, available from
www.abc.com.py.
37. “Brazil seeks closer defense relationship with China: defense minister,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, September
30, 2010, available from english.people.com.
38. Robert Benson, “Chinese Navy’s Historic Pearl Harbor
Visit,” Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Fall 1997, available from forum.
apan-info.net/fall_97/China_r.html. See also Young and Rustici.
39. The ships in question left the Chinese port of Qingdao in
October 2009, and completed their South American port calls in
December 2009. “Dos buques militares chinos de última generación visitan Ecuador,” Observatorio de la política China, December
12, 2009, available from www.politica-china.org.
40. One analysis notes that reports from past deployments
suggest that issues such as repairing or replacing critical parts,
and obtaining supplies such as fresh fruits and vegetables are critical obstacles for long-range force projection by the Chinese Navy.
See Young and Rustici.

50

41. See, for example, “Chinese, Chilean navy commanders discuss ties,” China Daily, Beijing, China, November 9, 2010, available
from chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/09/content_11524530.htm. See
also “Hawaii to Host 10th Western Pacific Naval Symposium,”
U.S. Navy, October 29, 2006, available from www.navy.mil/search/
display.asp?story_id=26329.
42. “Chinese honor guards shine at Mexico’s independence
parade,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, September 19, 2010,
available from english.people.com.cn.
43. “Ejércitos de Perú y China Concluyen operación de acción humanitaria conjunta en Lima,” Andina, Peru, November 30,
2010, available from www.andina.com.pe.
44. “Operación Conjunta China-Peru de Rescate Medico Humanitario ‘Angel de la Paz,” Maquina de Combate, November 24,
2010, available from maquina-de-combate.com/blog/archives/10429.
45. “Ejercitos de Peru y China Popular culminan operación
militar conjunta en salud,” Andina, Peru, November 30, 2010,
available from www.andina.com.pe.
46. Frank O. Mora, “Strategic Implications of China’s Evolving Relationship with Latin America,” Presentation to the Conference on China in Latin America, Washington DC, November 6,
2009, available from www.ndu.edu/chds/China-Wksp/Presentations/
CHDS-ChinaSpeech-Frank_Mora.pdf.
47. Interview with General Carlos Ospina-Ovalle, Former
Commander of the Colombian Armed Forces, Washington, DC,
January 12, 2011, regarding his personal perspective on why Colombia had not purchased significant military end items from the
PRC.
48. “Venezuela’s Chavez to buy Chinese K-8 planes,” Reuters,
May 11, 2008, available from www.reuters.com.
49. “Venezuela Air Force to take delivery on Chinese jet trainer K-8 Karakorum next year,” World Military Forum, November
28, 2009, available from www.armybase.us/2009/11/venezuela-airforce-to-take-delivery-on-chinese-jet-trainer-k-8-karakorum-next-year/.

51

50. “Aviación recibe primeros seis aviones chinos de combate
K-8W,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, March 13, 2010, available from www.el-universal.com.
51. Ibid.
52. “En agosto llegan 12 nuevos aviones K-8,” El Universal.
Caracas, Venezuela, June 30, 2010, available from www.el-universal.com.
53. The possibility of purchasing the L-15 was discussed in
meetings between the Chinese and Venezuelan military leadership in October 2009.
54. “Se cayó avión militar en Barquisimeto,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, July 21, 2010, available from www.el-universal.
com.
55. “Venezuela compra a China 12 aviones de transporte,” El
Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, November 29, 2010, available from
www.el-universal.com.
56. “Consideran comprar radares de baja cota,” El Universal,
Caracas, Venezuela, June 6, 2009, available from www.el-universal.
com.
57. Maria Daniela Espanoza, “FAN utilizará radar de origen
chino en ejercicio con Brasil,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela,
August 21, 2008, available from www.el-universal.com.
58. Noriega.
59. “Instalarán 10 radares chinos para mayor control del espacio aéreo,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, December 29, 2010,
available from www.el-universal.com.
60. The JYL-1 radars purchased by Venezuela from the Chinese reportedly have an effective detection range of 240 nautical
miles. For more information about the transaction, see “Consideran comprar radares de baja cota,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, June 6, 2009, available from www.el-universal.com.

52

61. Some confirmation of this activity appears in the resumes
of Huawei personnel who mention having worked on the modernization of the DICOFAN network. See, for example, Monica
Suinaga, Huawei Design Engineer, On-Line Resume, available
from ve.linkedin.com/pub/monica-suinaga/3/996/111.
62. Huawei establece alianzas con el sector académico venezolano,” Caracas Digital, January 24, 2011, available from www.
caracasdigital.com.
63. “Colombia pide la captura de un diputado venezolano por
‘Farcpolitica’,” El Tiempo, December 5, 2009, available from www.
eltiempo.com; See also “Fiscalía colombiana ordena detención de
diputado venezolano Figueroa,” El Comercio, Quito, Ecuador, December 6, 2009, available from www.elcomercio.com.
64. “Ecuador recibirá radares chinos para su frontera con Colombia,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, September 29, 2009,
available from www.el-universal.com.
65. “Ecuador instalará cuatro radares en la frontera con Colombia este año,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, August 16,
2010, available from www.el-universal.com.
66. Interview with Guido Zambrano, Ministry of Transportation and Public Works, Quito, Ecuador, July 8, 2007.
67. “Ecuador negocia con China compra de aviones logísticos
Javier Fernandez,” El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, July 30, 2009,
available from www.eluniverso.com. See also “Ecuador comprará
aviones a China, para reemplazar gran parte de su flota actual,”
Aviación Argentina-over-blog, July 30, 2009, available from aviacionargentina.over-blog.com/article-34443350.html.
68. “China Duplicará Colaboración Militar Copn Ecuador,
Según Fuerzas Armadas Del Vecino Pais,” El Tiempo, Bogota, Colombia, February 15, 2010, available from www.eltiempo.com.
69. “Ecuador comprará aviones de transporte militar chinos,”
El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, August 16, 2010, available from
www.eluniverso.com.

53

70. “Proyectos de la Fuerza Aerea Ecuatoriana,” Saorbats,
Ecuador, available from www.saorbats.com.ar/news/1611. See also
“Ecuador comprará aviones de transporte militar chinos.”
71. “China Duplicará Colaboración Militar Copn Ecuador.”
72. “Bolivia comprará aviones chinos para lucha antidroga,”
El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October 2, 2009, available from
www.eluniverso.com.
73. “Bolivia to receive combat aircraft from China,” Asia One,
January 19, 2011, available from www.asiaone.com.
74. “Gobierno ratifica compra de naves chinas y rusas,” Los
Tiempos, Cochabamba, Bolivia, January 15, 2010, available from
www.lostiempos.com. See also “Bolivia to receive combat aircraft
from China,” Asia One, January 29, 2011, available from www.asiaone.com.
75. “El gobierno decide potenciar la fuerza aérea,” La Razón,
La Paz, Bolivia, February 19, 2007, available from www.la-razon.
com. See also “La FAB se fortalece con un avión de carga,” La
Razón, La Paz, Bolivia, August 2, 2007, available from www.larazon.com.
76. “In 2007, Bolivia sextuplico su deuda,” El Deber, Santa
Cruz, Bolivia, January 31, 2008, available from www.eldeber.com.bo.
77. “China dono equipos a las fuerzas armadas,” Los Tiempos,
Cochabamba, Bolivia, December 16, 2006, available from www.
lostiempos.com.
78. “China regaló 43 vehiculos a las fuerzas armadas,” El Deber, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, September 11, 2007, available from www.
eldeber.com.bo.
79. “China donó a las FF.AA. de Bolivia US$2,6 millones,”
AmericaEconomia, March 31, 2010, available from www.americaeconomia.com.

54

80. “Bolivia y China fortalecen cooperación militar,” Los Tiempos, Cochabamba, Bolivia, August 18, 2010, available from www.
lostiempos.com.
81. “Bolivia aclara que 10.000 fusiles fueron donados por
China y no por Venezuela,” Terra, June 26, 2008, available from
noticias.terra.es.
82. “Novedad en Parada Militar fue la presentación de cinco
nuevos tanques chinos MBT 2000,” Agencia Peruana de Noticias,
December 8, 2009, available from www.andina.com.pe. See also
“Tanques chinos: El Ejército está de acuerdo con la compra,”
Peru21, Lima, Peru, December 10, 2009, available from peru21.com.
pe.
83. “El Ejecutivo busca postergar la compra de tanques chinos,” Gestion, Lima, Peru, April 6, 2010, available from gestion.pe/
noticia/457657/ejecutivo-buscar-postergar-compra-tanques-chinos.
84. “Perú y China firman un convenio de cooperación por 800
mil dólares,” El Comercio, Lima, Peru, November 11, 2007, available from www.elcomerciol.com.pe.
85. Carlos Ospina-Ovalle. Former Commander-in-Chief of
the Colombian Armed Forces, Interview, Washington, DC, December 1, 2009.
86. For photos of these cars in the colors of the municipal
pólice of Montevideo, see “Geely Policía de Montevideo,” Flickr,
available from www.flickr.com/photos/13328329@N06/4191019109/.
87. “En el Perú ya se venden autos de la marca Geely,” El Comercio, Lima, Peru, August 1, 2007, available from www.elcomercio.
com.pe.
88. “China dona US$1 millón a Colombia para armamentos,”
ABC, Asuncion, Paraguay, September 6, 2010, available from
www.abc.com.py.
89. “Costa Rica pidió a China Continental entrenamiento policial,” El Nuevo Diario, Managua, Nicaragua, November 3, 2010,
available from www.elnuevodiario.com.ni.

55

90. “Negocia la Argentina comprar helicópteros militares a
China,” La Nación, Buenos Aires, Argentina, May 17, 2007, available from www.lanacion.com.ar.
91. Guido Bratslavsky, “Licitación de radares: Ya hay trece
empresas interesadas,” Clarín, Buenos Aires, Argentina, January
29, 2007, available from www.clarin.com.
92. “Norinco Wmz-551b1 Ea,” Socyberty, October 3, 2010,
available from socyberty.com/military/norinco-wmz-551b1-ea.
93. Christian Vilada, “Argentina evalúa la adquisición de
blindados chinos,” Saorbats, August 27, 2008, available from www.
saorbats.com.ar/news/494.
94. Jorge Elias, “Opinión: Llegaron los VCTP WMZ-551B1
chinos,” Desarrollo y Defensa, September 10, 2010, available from
desarolloydefensa.blogspot.com.
95. “Brazil seeks closer defense relationship with China: defense minister,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, September
30, 2010, available from english.people.com.
96. “¿Privatización de Codelco? El rescate de los mineros
pone en vitrina a la estatal,” AmericaEconomia, December 12, 2010,
available from www.americaeconomia.com.
97. “China sends $3.5M in military equipment to Jamaica,”
Today Online, January 15, 2011, available from www.todayonline.
com.
98. “Paraguay soldiers using Chinese M4 (CQ 5.56) carbines,”
MilitaryPhotos.Net, February 9, 2008, available from www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?141091-Paraguay-soldiers-usingChinese-M4-(CQ-5.56)-rifles.
99. Firearms Trafficking: US efforts to face Arms Trafficking to
Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges, GAO-09-709,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, June
2009.

56

100. Christopher Bodeen, “Future of Embraer China Plant Depends on Beijing,” ABC News, November 17, 2010, available from
abcnews.go.com. See also Macauhub, November 26, 2010, available
from Macau. www.macauhub.com.mo. See also “Brazil’s Embraer
admits possibility of abandoning operations in China,” Macauhub,
Macau, Brazil, May 6, 2010, available from www.macauhub.com.mo.
101. “China invertirá 300 milliones de dólares en linea aerea
venezolana,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, April 23, 2010,
available from www.el-universal.com.
102. According to the agreement, within the umbrella of
AVIC companies, two helicopters will be acquired from Changhe
Aircraft Industries Group, while a total of 31 Y-12 fixed wing aircraft will be manufactured by Hafei Aviation Industry Co. Lan
Lan and Mao Lijun, “AVIC Bags Big Deal in Venezuela,” China
Daily, July 13, 2010, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn.
103. Peter Ritter. “The New Space Race: China vs. US,” Time,
February 13, 2008, available from www.time.com.
104. In October 2007, China put an unmanned probe in orbit around the moon, and contemplates manned missions to the
moon in the future. Jeffrey Logan, “China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation,” Document RS22777, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 29, 2008.
105. Great Wall Industries, available from www.cgwic.com.
106. “Satellites: CBERS-1, 2 and 2B | CBERS-3 and 4,” ChinaBrazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS), available from www.
cbers.inpe.br.
107 . “Chinese Space Policy: Collaboration or Competition,”
Washington, DC; Center for Strategic and International Studies,
March 23, 2010, available from csis.org.
108. Fabíola de Olivera. O Brasil Chega Ao Espaço: SCD-1 satélite de coleta de dados, São José dos Campos, São Paolo, Brasil : Instituto Nacional de Pequisas Espaciais, 1996, p. 81.
109. “Hu Jintao Visits the China-Brazil Aeronautics and Space
Cooperation Project in Sao Paulo,” Beijing, China: Ministry of
57

Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 15,
2004, available from www.fmprc.gov.cn.
110. De Olivera.
111. Gyanesh Chander, “An Overview of the CBERS-2 satellite and comparison of the CBERS-2 CCD data with the L5 TM
data,” Presentation, Washington, DC: U.S. Geological Survey,
March 16, 2006.
112. Ironically, China and Brazil both ultimately joined the
Missile Technology Control Regime. Luis Bitencourt, “Developing Countries and Missile Proliferation: The Cases of Argentina,
Brazil and India,” Ph.D. dissertation, Washington DC: Catholic
University of America, 2001, p. 149.
113. “Brazil To Deepen Space Cooperation With China,” Space
Daily, March 27, 2008, available from www.spacedaily.com.
114. See R. Evan Ellis, “New Frontiers? China – Latin America
Space Cooperation,” Security and Defense Studies Review, Vol. 10,
Spring-Summer 2010, p. 125.
115. “Chávez celebra satellite para construer el socalismo,” El
Mercurio, Santiago, Chile, October 30, 2008, available from diario.
elmercurio.cl.
116. “Venezuela inicia operaciones del Satélite Simón Bolívar,”
El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, January 10, 2009, available from
www.eluniversal.com.
117. James Suggett, “Venezuela to Launch its First Satellite
from China in November,” Venezuelanalysis, August 18, 2008,
available from www.venezuelanalysis.com.
118. “Bolivian, Chinese Tupac Katari Satellite Partnership
Now Official,” Satellite Today, April 6, 2010, available from www.
satellitetoday.com/civilspace/yheadlines/Bolivian-Chinese-Tupac-Katari-Satellite-Partnership-Now-Official_33806.html.
119. “Bolivia firmó convenio con China para construcción
de satélite Túpac Katari,” El Comercio, Lima, Peru, April 1, 2010,
available from elcomercio.pe.
58

120. “China aprueba crédito para satélite boliviano,” Los
Tiempos, La Paz, Bolivia, December 24, 2010, available from www.
lostiempos.com.
121. “Venezuela CANTV Selected Huawei Technologies to
Upgrade Its Optical Fiber National Backbone Network,” Huawei,
December 31, 2004, available from www.huawei.com.
122. Jamie Hulse, China’s Expansion into and U.S. Withdrawal
from Argentina’s Telecommunications and Space Industries and the Implications for U.S. National Security, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2007.
123. “Arianespace Lands Arsat-1 Launch Contract,” SpaceNews, June 28, 2010, available from www.spacenews.com.
124. “Defensa sondea 25 empresas para construir el nuevo satélite chileno,” El Mercurio, Santiago, Chile, April 18, 2007, available from diario.elmercurio.cl.
125. “Astrium presents the completed SSOT satellite to the
Chilean government,” EADS Astrium, February 9, 2010, available
from www.astrium.eads.net/en/news/astrium-presents-the-completedssot-satellite-to-the-chilean-government.html.
126. “Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization starts operation,” China View, December 16, 2008, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/16/content_10514901.htm.
127. Juan Arvizu and Horacio Jimenez, “Crean diputados
agencia especial Mexicana,” El Universal, Mexico City, Mexico,
April 20, 2010, available from www.eluniversal.com.mx.
128. “Invitados,” Conferencia Espacial de las Americas,
available
from
conferenciaespacialdelasamericas.org/agencias_
espaciales.html.
129. The projects are described in general terms in the the
websites of both companies. See, for example, “Huawei America
Latina,” available from www.huawei.com/es/catalog.do?id=343. See
also Hulse.

59

130. See, for example, Daniel Ricardo Hernandez, “Móvil bolivariano costar BsF 30,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, March
5, 2009, available from www.el-universal.com.
131. The 1,000-mile cable will extend from Camurey, Venezuela, to Siboney, Cuba, and is expected to be functional in July
2011. “Cuba, Venezuela Link Via Undersea Cable,” The Right Perspective, January 23, 2011, available from www.therightperspective.
org.
132. “Preocupados trabajadores por possible privatizacion de
Hondutel,” La Tribuna, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, October 23, 2010,
available from www.latribuna.com.
133. Jia Wen. “Remembering Chinese peacekeepers in Haiti,”
Global Times, January 19, 2010, available from opinion.globaltimes.
cn/observer/2010-01/499318.html.
134. Manuel Cereijo, “Inside Bejucal Base in Cuba: A Real
Threat,” The Americano, August 27, 2010, available from theamericano.com/2010/08/27/bejucal-base-cuba-real-threat/. Cereijo’s allegations concerning Bejucal, however, have been questioned by Cuban scholar William Ratliff, among others, noting that the radar
domes in the photo accompanying Cereijo’s article are not located
at Bejucal, as represented, but rather, the U.S.-operated Menwith
Hill facility in the United Kingdom. See “Cereijo, Bejucal, China
and Cuba’s adversary foreign intelligence (Bill Ratliff, US),” Stanford, CA: World Association of International Studies, Stanford
University, April 3, 2006, available from waisworld.org/go.jsp?id=0
2a0&objectType=post&objectTypeId=3776&topicId=10.
135. “Chinese Signals Intelligence and Cyberwarfare in Cuba,”
AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes, No. 23-06, June 12, 2006, available
from www.afio.com/sections/wins/2006/2006-23.html#ChinaInCuba.
136. “China begins 26th Antarctica season with a team of
251 scientists,” Mercopress, October 14, 2009, available from
en.mercopress.com/2009/10/13/china-begins-26th-antarctica-seasonwith-a-team-of-251-scientists.
137. Young and Rustici.

60

138. “China bolsters Antarctica posts,” BBC News, November
6, 2007, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7080888.stm.
139. Andrew Darby, “China flags its Antarctic intent,” The Sidney Morning Herald, January 11, 2010, available from www.smh.com.
au/opinion/politics/china-flags-its-antarctic-intent-20100111-m287.
html.
140. Young and Rustici.
141. J. Michael Waller, “China’s Beachhead at Panama Canal,” BNet, August 16, 1999, available from findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_30_15/ai_55481519/.
142. A similar argument was made by Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Frank O. Mora, “Strategic Implications of
China’s Evolving Relationship with Latin America,” Presentation
to the Conference on China in Latin America, Washington, DC,
November 6, 2009, available from www.ndu.edu/chds/China-Wksp/
Presentations/CHDS-ChinaSpeech-Frank_Mora.pdf.
143. José Melendez, “La mafia china aumenta el tráfico de
personas en AL,” El Universal, Mexico City, Mexico, May 10, 2007,
available from www.eluniversal.com.mx.
144. “China Tightens Restrictions on Online Transactions of
Drug Precursor Chemicals,” Xinhua, September 27, 2010, available from english.cri.cn/6909/2010/09/27/45s596567.htm.
145. See, for example, Daisy Johnson, “Developments regarding the Copper Reserve Fund in the Chilean Defence Funding
Strategy,” Defense Viewpoints, January 21, 2011, available from
www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/developmentsregarding-the-copper-reserve-fund-in-the-chilean-defence-fundingstrategy.
146. “Assistant Secretary Valenzuela’s Travel to China,” U.S.
Department of State, August 12, 2010, available from www.state.
gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/08/145941.htm.

61

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Gregg F. Martin
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
Author
Dr. R. Evan Ellis
Director of Publications
Dr. James G. Pierce
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

